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should be accelerated. I will begin by evaluating the relative merits of separation, accommodation, and neutrality.
I. SEPARATION
A separationist seeks to erect "a wall between church and State ... high and impregnable.',7 Of course absolute separation is impossible. For example, Everson, which gave us the "wall" metaphor, allowed, to the dismay of the dissenters, parochial school children to ride a bus at taxpayer expense. 8 But even the dissenters agreed that police and fIre protection was available to the Church, and not just on the theory that it may be necessary to quench a church fIre in order to keep it from spreading to secular property.9 Thus, all would agree that complete and total separation is not possible.
But there are those who would like to maximize separation at every turn. For the most part this viewpoint dominated the landscape during the 1970s in regard to public funding of parochial education. In the landmark Lemon case, for example, the Court invalidated a supplement to the secular teachers in religious schools on the ground that any infusion of religion by a partially subsidized teacher would violate the Establishment Clause.
1O Furthermore, even a school's promise not to infuse religion was thought to be inadequate because without monitoring, there was always the possibility of intentional or unintentional infusion. I 1 Finally, the necessary monitoring was thought to create excessive entanglement between Church and State. 12 Of course, if the Court had used a neutrality standard, nobody would have cared if the teacher had injected religion so long as she had provided the school with its secular money's worth. Under a neutrality standard, if the cost to the State of teaching a child English in a parochial school was no more than it would have expended on that child in a public school (or secular private school), it is hard to see how the State fInanced religion. In a worse case scenario, the State merely fInanced English and failed to prevent religion from being taught at no extra cost. 
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Separationist theory has had a considerably more checkered history in regard to tax exemptions and deductions. Although a tax exemption for churches has been approved, largely on a neutrality theory, 13 tax deductions for a parochial school education were disapproved in the 1970s.1 4 Strangely, nobody has successfully challenged charitable deductions for contributions to a church. Thus, if one contributes $1,000 to a church, and as part of that contribution is able to educate one's child in religion, the deduction is probably valid.
15 BtU if one pays $1,000 to the church to educate her child in English and math, the tuition may not be deductible. To one not steeped in the intricacies of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, this dichotomy must seem perverse.
n. ACCOMMODATION An accommodationist is willing to allow government to treat religion better than non-religion in some particulars. When this is done to alleviate a burden on free exercise of religion, such as allowing Native Americans to smoke peyote, 16 or allowing ceremonial use of wine in an otherwise dry county, 17 few would seriously challenge the practice. IS However, there is a significant school of thought that would allow the government to accommodate religion even when free exercise is in.no way compromised. BRANDEIS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
Zorach v. Clauson l9 originated the concept in an opinion upholding the early dismissal of those public school students who chose to attend religious classes outside of school. The Court believed that a contrary decision would constitute a "callous indifference" to religion. 2o Thus, the Court allowed the school to suspend learning, while detaining students not receiving religious training, in order to facilitate the religious training of the released students. 21
The Court has also upheld legislative prayer 22 and the display of a cityowned creche in a Christmas display.23 And, perhaps most perniciously, has implied that a whole host of seemingly minor paeans to the Deity are constitutionally permissible under the rubric of"ceremonial Deism.,,24 Included in these are the Supreme Court's opening invocation "May God save the United States and this honorable Court," the phrase "In God we trust" on our coins and currency, and the phrase "under God" in the flag salute.25 ill. NEUTRALITY The phrase "neutrality" first prominently appeared in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the school prayer cases,26 particularly Schempp, where the Court described it as "wholesome neutrality.,,2? Of course, whether a particular decision invalidating legislation designed to favor religion is "wholesome neutrality" or "callous indifference" depends largely on the emotional state of mind of the evaluator. Either tenn could have been used to describe the invalidation of the bible reading statute at issue in Schempp. For that matter, either tenn could have been applied to the opinion of the four Justices who sought to invalidate the Zorach practice. The key is to find a meaningful principle. 19 
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In my mind, Justice O'Connor's much maligned endorsement/disapproval test would, if taken seriously,28 provide a viable standard for deciding Establishment Clause cases. The test has been maligned on at least two grounds. One suggests that it does not accurately portray the Court's actual decision-making process. 29 The other critique is that it is incapable of achieving certainty because those who apply it do not always reach the same result.30 As to the first criticism, it probably is correct that the Court does not always apply the endorsement/disapproval test in a serious way. But, it is the contention of this paper that it ought to. As to results varying under the test, that is true of most any test. There will always be close cases upon which reasonable people applying the same test might reach different results. 31
The core of the endorsement/disapproval test is that it precludes disfavoring religion as much as favoring it. Although some argue that disapproval belongs with free exercise rather than establishment,32 I think this criticism misses the mark. It is no part of the Establishment Clause to be hostile to religion in any way. 
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Four other Justices would have allowed the display on the ground that even if religion appeared to be favored, that was a nonproblematic accommodation.43
The case was ultimately decided on neutrality grounds by Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Souter who held that so long as a reasonable person would not perceive the government to be endorsing religion, neutrality principle required that the cross be allowed. 44 In my view, these Justices got it absolutely right. On the whole, this is a good thing. No serious scholar has ever contended that the Establishment Clause was intended to bespeak hostility towards religion. Yet that is exactly what happens in a regime that allows the State to pay a student's tuition or an English teacher's salary at a private nonreligious school, but denies the same to students and teachers at a private religious school.
V. NEUTRALITY AND THE FINANCING OF PAROCHIAL EDUCATION
My only hesitancy in reaching this conclusion is the possibility that in some cities, public schools will be so bad that a student would opt for any affordable alternative. To the extent that a City, such as Cleveland in Zelman, makes funds available to a religious school as the only realistic alternative to a bad 43 See id. at 757 (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Thomas). See also id. at 770 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the cross, in this context" was political and not religious). 
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BRANDEIS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41 public school, I am concerned. For example, let us hypothesize that for a particular Baptist (or Jewish or Atheist) student in a poor section of town, her two realistic choices are public school (which is terrible) and Catholic School (which is much better, but requires religious exercises with which the student is uncomfortable). Such a student may well feel driven by the State to accept an. intolerable religion in order to obtain an acceptable education.
Although the above scenario is problematic, I do not believe that it is unconstitutional. Without State vouchers, the hypothetical student has one bad choice, the public school. With the voucher, she has two bad choices: the public school or the school espousing the wrong religion. Given that the student makes the choice (and can still opt for the bad public school that she would have in the absence of a choice), I believe that the statute was rightly upheld. Perhaps with evidence that students in large numbers were being effectively forced into schools of a different religion from their own, it might be appropriate to rethink complete neutrality. But, absent such evidence, neutrality appears to be a viable principle.
VI. NEUTRALITY AND DEIFIC RECOGNITION
The move towards neutrality (and away from accommodation) is not so clear in the deific recognition cases, but it is discernible. One need only compare the tone of the Lee v. Weisman 51 opinion with the later opinion in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe.
52
In Lee, the Court very cautiously invalidated a graduation prayer at a middle school delivered by a clergyman.53 In so holding, the Court emphasized the special importance of graduation to the students and the coercive character of prayer to nonbelievers. The four Justice dissent, advocating accommodation, was extraordinarily vitriolic even by Justice Scalia's standards. 
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Santa Fe, on the other hand, invalidated a student-led prayer at a football game, a place where it would have been relatively easy for students to ignore the prayer. The tone of the opinion seemed to reflect impatience with the school district for not understanding the importance of remaining neutral on deific issues. The dissent, on the other hand, was rather placid, almost resigned to a view that official deific recognition in schools will be unconstitutional so long as the current Court sits. 55 Cases demanding neutrality as opposed to disapproval are moving in the same direction. From Board ofEducation ofWestside Community Schools v. Mergens,56 to Lamb's Chapel,57 to Good News,58 the Court's opinions are increasingly emphasizing the impropriety of disfavoring religion. Of course, the difference in the cases is that Santa Fe singles out religion for special favored treatment, whereas Good News merely allows religion to compete for space along with everything else. Although we are talking about the center of the Court,59 the center does seem to take neutrality seriously in regard to deific recognition in schools.
VII. CEREMONIAL DEISM
Ceremonial Deism is an annoying and pernicious phrase first brought into judicial decisions by Justice Brennan. 60 It is thought to justify phrases such as he cheerfully concludes by suggesting a way for religiously-minded schools to thwart this decision so that "the graduates and their parents may proceed to thank God, as It is doubtful that any litigant would have standing to challenge either of these practices although an atheist litigating a question before the Supreme Court against a Christian would certainly feel at disadvantage. 62 Do we or should we care that these public paeans to the Deity continue unabated (and arguably unabatable)? My answer is that we should care because phrases such as these clearly endorse much of our citizenry while disapproving a minority that should not have to tolerate it. 63 But sadly, the majority likes the endorsement so much, that there would be hell to pay64 if we were to remove it.
A good example is the recent flap over the Ninth Circuit's Newdow decision. 65 Although correctly decided for the reasons described in my appended editorial,66 the flap over the decision has rivaled that of the flag burning and school prayer cases combined. Of course, to the shallow viewer, Newdow is an attack on God and country. To the more sophisticated critic, it is an attempt to put each in its proper sphere. Newdow, were it to be afflnned by the Supreme Court, would ensure that nobody is put in the position of having to feign Godliness to avoid being condemned as unpatriotic. Furthermore, it would continue the Court on the march toward neutrality that its recent jurisprudence has so carefully developed.
vrn. CONCLUSION
Ordinarily, neutrality is a sound starting point for Establishment Clause jurisprudence. It avoids the potentially harsh concept of separation which too frequently treats religious institutions as second class citizens. It also avoids the mushiness of accommodation which, at times, treats nonbelievers as second 61 Part of the Court's willingness to accommodate religion in Zoraeh v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
